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JURISDICTION
Appellees Temple View Investments, Greg Stuart, William D'Evelyn and Richard
Bennion (herein collectively referred to as "Appellees") do not contest the jurisdiction
of the Utah Court of Appeals and admit this Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §782a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Are there any "material facts" that would prevent the District Court from

granting Summary Judgment?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate Courts view facts in the light most favorable to the losing party below.
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Bearden v. Croft. 31 P.3d 537 ^5, 2001
UT. 76, 428 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 (UT 2001).

2.

Can a Motion for Summary Judgment be successfully refuted under Rule

56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by inadmissible evidence?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Correctness standard. Bearden v. Croft, supra.

1

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Wells Fargo brought an action for Breach of Contract - Note and

*

Breach of Guarantees against the Appellees on May 15, 2002, arising out of a
promissory note dated November 1,1985 in the principal amount of $339,232.30. Said

,

note was due and payable on or before June 1, 1995. Wells Fargo's action was
commenced some 6 years and 11 V% months after the due date of the note. Appellees
i

moved to dismiss Wells Fargo's action as being beyond the six (6) year statute of
limitationsfromthe due date of the note based upon two separate Utah State statutes.
Wells Fargo responded with an Affidavitfromits former legal counsel, John Anderson,

4

which introduced into the Court file a letter written by Appellees' attorney Thomas
Rogan in August of 1997 in an effort to settle and compromise the dispute. Appellees
i

in turn moved to strike the affidavit of John Anderson on the grounds that the affidavit
lacked foundation, constituted heresay and otherwise introduced a document that is
inadmissible in evidence under Rule 408 URE as an offer to settle a disputed matter.
The District Court held that the Rogan letter was not a reaffirmation of the debt. The
Court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations.
Wells Fargofileda motion for new trial which was denied by the Court on the grounds
that there was nothing new in the facts or the law submitted by Wells Fargo. Wells
Fargo appealed.

2

(

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Some additional background information may be helpful to put this case in
perspective.
1.

In 1985, Appellees acquired an office complex in Utah County by

delivering a promissory note of approximately $1,000,000.00 to First Security Bank and
a second unsecured promissory note to DeLance W. Squires doing business as Temple
View Associates, a Utah partnership1. (The enforceability of this note is the issue in the
present litigation). The real property turned out to be grossly misrepresented and
resulted in substantial litigation, foreclosure of the property and bankruptcy proceedings.
On July 15, 1991, Appellees entered into a "Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure, Agreed
Deficiency and a Trust Deed Note Renewal Agreement" with First Security Bank.
Appellees have fully performed their obligations under that settlement agreement with
Wells Fargo's predecessor First Security Bank. Wells Fargo's predecessor (First
Interstate Bank) continued to pursue action against DeLance Squires and through a
bankruptcy adversary proceeding apparently obtained the second note in question.
There was a January 5, 1995 Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement in that
adversary proceeding that Appellees were not parties to, nor was John Anderson, former

1

The use of the name Temple View Associates and Temple View Investment by both
the holders and makers of the note creates confusion. These are two (2) separate unrelated
entities. Hence, Appellees herein are referred to as 'Appellees'.
3

4
legal counsel to Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo at all times appears to be acting as personal
representative of the Franklin Bradshaw Estate and as successor in interest to both First
Interstate Bank and First Security Bank. All of that is irrelevant to the present litigation
except to the extent that the John Anderson affidavit herein appears to be confusing the
two separate transactions2. Hence, the Anderson affidavit creates confusion in the
present action because it lacks sufficient foundational clarity, contains heresay and other
inadmissible statements. Appellees in their original and Reply Memorandum in Support
of their Motion to Strike the Affidavit of John Anderson specifically objected to
paragraphs 2,4,5,6,8,11,12,13,14,15,16,17 and 18, as well as the Thomas Rogan
letter attached thereto dated August 29,1997. See Courtfilepages 80-99.
2.

On approximately April 19, 1989, Temple View Associates, a Utah

partnership (DeLance Squires), and the purported holder of the note in question in the
present action, commenced a legal action in Civil No. CV89-842 in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah to collect on said note. Appellees
appeared through legal counsel,filedan Answer in said action and denied any liability.
The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute on November 30, 19903.
3.

The affidavits of Greg Stuart, William D'Evelyn and Richard Bennion

supporting their motion for summary judgment are attached hereto collectively as
2

The original note was payable to First Security Bank in the amount of $1,000,00.00
and was secured by the office complex. The second is an unsecured note to Temple View
Associates, a Utah corporation (DeLance Squires) in the amount of $339,232.00.
3

This Court may take judicial notice of the public record. U.R.E - 201.
4

Exhibit "A". Said affidavits contain uncontroverted evidence that: (1) there have been
no payments on said promissory note from July 1, 1994 to the present, (2) these
individuals never executed personal guarantees, (3) these individuals never agreed to a
forbearance, or that the holder could stop payments or delay payments or postpone
payments nor signed any forbearance agreement, and (4) the note was unsecured and
has been since its inception. Court file pages 13-21, inclusively.
4.

The Thomas F. Rogan letter dated August 29, 1997 is attached as an

exhibit to Appellant's brief. Wells Fargo's response dated September 19,1997 (Court's
file pages 67-77) is attached to Appellant's brief as Exhibit 7c and acknowledges that
said letter was "your client's offer of compromise". Said letter is an acknowledgment
that the Rogan August 29,1997 letter was an offer of compromise in a disputed matter
and an acknowledgment of the existence of the obligation nearly five (5) years prior to
Wells Fargo's commencement of the present action.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The two separate state statutes limiting collection of promissory notes to six years
clearly bars Appellant's action. Wells Fargo cannot defeat a Motion for Summary
Judgment with inadmissible evidence, under Rule 56(e) of the U.R.C.P. The Rogan
letter of August 1997 is not a "clear, distinct reaffirmation of debt" by Appellees, is not
a reaffirmation of debt at all, and is inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of
5

Evidence and therefore cannot be the basis for denying a Motion for Summary
Judgment under Rule 56(e). The Anderson affidavit likewise is clearly inadmissible for

*

lack of foundation and contains inadmissible setdement discussions and heresay. The
language of the note is not an agreement to extend the statute of limitations by its own
terms because it would otherwise affect the liability of the maker thereby nullifying part
of the note language itself. There was no agreement to extend payment terms, there was
•i

no payment after the due date of the note, and the statute of limitations has clearly run.
*

ARGUMENT
POINTI
THE TWO SIX YEAR STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS BAR APPELLANT'S
ACTION ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE
The note was signed and delivered on November 1,1985. On page 2 of the note
it expressly provides:
"The full amount principal and interest remaining unpaid shall be due and
payable on or before June 1,1995."
A promissory note is payable "at a definite time" if there is a fixed date which is
readily ascertainable at the time the promise or the order is issued. U.C.A. §70A-3108(2).
U.C.A. §70A-3-l 18 provides in relevant part:
"STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

6

1.
Except as provided in sub-section (5), an action to enforce the
obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be
commenced within six years after the due date or date stated in the note,
or if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due
date....
5.

(Not applicable as pertaining to a certificate of deposit)." (Our
emphasis).

This provision of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted in the State of Utah indicates
that "the due date" is the starting period for the six year statute of limitations, which
cause of action accrues or begins on the day after June 1,1995.
U.C.A. §78-12-23 provides in relevant part:
"WITHIN SIX YEARS - MESNE PROFITS OF REAL PROPERTY INSTRUMENT IN WRITING.
An action may be brought within six years:... (2) upon any contract, obligation,
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in
§78-12-224."
Wells Fargo's action was not filed until May 15, 2002, some 6 years and 11 lA months
after its cause of action on the note accrued.
The defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested right. Roark v.
Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058 (UT. 1995). As a general rule, a promissory note cannot waive
the statute of limitations. Hirtler v. Hirtler. 566 P.2d 1231 (UT 1977). The Court in
Hirtler. noted:

4

78-12-22 provides for an eight year statute of limitations based on a judgment or a
decree and is not applicable to the present matter.
7

t

"Statutes of limitation are not designed exclusively for the benefit of individuals
but are also for the public good. These statutes of repose are intended to prevent
the revival and enforcement of stale demands; against which it may be difficult
to defend, because of lapse of time, fading of memory and possible loss of
documents." At page 1231.
Hirtler noted that waivers of the statute of limitations are void and unenforceable as
contrary to public policy.
It is important to note that the promissory note in question has always been
unsecured. Affidavits of Stuart, Bennion and D'Evelyn. Hence, law in Utah that the
statute does not run against the co-maker until the security is lost under APS v. Briggs.
927 P.2d 670 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) has no application to the facts in the present matter.
Appellant's action was filed on May 15, 2002, some six (6) years and 11 Vz
months after the note matured and was due and payable. Appellant's action is clearly
barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant cannot toll or extend the statute of
limitations by indicating that a promissory note is not in default when the plain
language of the promissory note indicates it is due and payable on June 1, 1995.
Appellant's assertion that a default was not declared is irrelevant and Appellant has
cited no reliable authority for the proposition that Appellant can unilaterally extend the
statute of limitations by not demanding payment. Failure to declare a default does not
automatically extend the statute of limitations when there is a specific due date in the
note. Appellant's reliance upon settlement discussions is inadmissible under Rule 408
and affords no legal basis for extending the six year statute of limitations. It is clear

8

I

i

from the record that Appellant had knowledge of the existence of the obligation for at
least 5 years prior to filing its action and simply dallied until its legal rights were lost.

POINT H
THE LANGUAGE OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE DOES NOT EXTEND THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Appellant argues that the pre-printed form language of the promissory note
constitutes an agreement that the note may be extended from time to time and was
extended because Appellant's counsel did not demand payment until September 19,
1997. (Appellant's opening brief pages 14-18). The sentence in the note contains this
important qualifier:
"The makers.. .expressly agree that this note, or any payment thereunder, may be
extendedfromtime to time without in anv wav effecting (sic) the liability of the
makers and endorsers thereof. (Our emphasis)."
A fair reading of this qualification in the sentence is that the makers did not intend to
extend their liability on the underlying obligation and therefore could not have agreed
to extend the statute of limitations by this language. In fact, the makers (Appellees)
believed that sentence entitled the holders to demand strict compliance or declare default
even if the holders allowed Appellees to continue their payments beyond the due date.
Consequently, the note language did not alter the liability of the makers under the note.
However, no payment was made by anyone after 1994. Affidavits of Stuart, Bennion
and D'Evelyn. Lastly, there was no express agreement at any time by Wells Fargo to
9

extend the repayment obligation, or was there any request to extend it by the makers
(Appellees). See Affidavits of Bennion, Stuart and D'Evelyn.
Appellant's reliance on Fisher v. Fisher. 907 P.2d 1172 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) at
pages 16-17 of Appellant's opening brief is misplaced. In Fisher, the court after trial
found that an equitable, (not legal) basis existed to modify the original agreement based
on facts unique to that case. The record supported the finding that there was an express
agreement to modify the contract that Plaintiff Fisher knew of and acquiesced in. Here,
there is no such agreement and the note is definite and distinct and covered by a specific
statute of limitations.
In a bankruptcy proceeding, a Court held that a forbearance by a creditor to call
a demand note is "not an extension or renewal of credit" within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act. In re Colasante. 12 BR 635 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. Louisiana National Bank. 653 F.2d 927 (CA 5th 1981). the court held
that under Louisana law..."the obligee's mere gratuitous forebearance from exercising
its legal rights under an instrument of indebtedness has been held not to create an
agreement to extend the period of indebtedness." Page 940. Here, there can be no
extension simply because Wells Fargo failed to demand payment for a couple of years,
being fully aware of the existence of the note.

10

POINT m
THE ROGAN LETTER AND U.C.A. §78-12-44 (1966) DO NOT EXTEND THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Appellant argues that U.C.A. §78-12-44 (1966) constitutes "an acknowledgment
of an existing liability, debt or claim". The statute in relevant part provides:
"In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall
have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or
any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought
within the time prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or
promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the
party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions
of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of
defense." (Our emphasis).
In the present case there are no writings signed by any of the named Appellees, Stuart,
D 'Evelyn, Bennion or Temple View after the original note was made in 1985 that extend
the statute of limitations. There is no express acknowledgment of this obligation by
these same individuals after the maturity date of June 1, 1995.
A.

Wells Fargo claims that the Thomas Rogan letter dated August 29,1997

is such an acknowledgment of an outstanding liability or obligation. Appellees moved
to strike the affidavit of John Anderson which contained the Rogan letter as
inadmissible evidence under Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 408 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part:
"Compromise and Offers to Compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
11

i

attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations
is likewise not admissible...." (Our emphasis).
The above-cited Rule of Evidence provides that not only are statements made in
compromise negotiations not admissible, the statements are not admissible "to prove
liability for" a claim. District Courts are bound to follow the Rules of Evidence. Rule
1101(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1974).
Thomas Rogan was an attorney retained to defend the litigation on this note in
Utah County in 1989 in Civil No. 89-842. That action was dismissed for failure to
prosecute. A close examination of the August 1997 Rogan letter demonstrates that
Appellees variously denied liability because they were "fraudulently induced...into
making the note", and that there was a failure to disclose other items to the makers of
the note. Paragraph 7 of the Rogan letter specifically is a proposed compromise of a
claim that is "disputed as to liability and amount" and refers to the document as a
"settlement proposal". Paragraph 8 also intimates that it is an attempt to resolve "this
dispute". The responsive letter of September 19,1997 on Van Cott Bagley letterhead
attached as Exhibit 7c to Appellant's brief and to the Anderson affidavit (Courtfile6777) acknowledges receipt of the Rogan letter and "of your client's offer of compromise
in the above-captioned matter". "I forwarded the offer to my client who quite frankly
finds the offer rather insulting". There can be no legal question that the Rogan letter
was an attempt to compromise a disputed claim wherein Appellees denied liability

12

because offraudulentinducement, and the same letter is treated or acknowledged by
Appellant's attorney as a "offer of compromise" and an insulting offer at that. This offer
of compromise and Wells Fargo's attorney's acknowledgment of it being an offer of
compromise clearly brings the document within Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
and renders it inadmissible. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that supporting and opposing affidavits to a motion for summary judgment "shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence". Appellees submit that the court
cannot deny its motion for summary judgment that was otherwise appropriate, based
on factual issues that are not admissible in evidence. See, generally: Treloggan v.
Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747 (UT 1985); Gawv.State. 798 P.2d 1130 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990);
Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d 1021 (UT 1968). An affidavit consisting of inadmissible
parole evidence used for the purpose of altering terms of a written agreement was
ineffective. Rainford v. Rvtting. 22 UT. 2d 252,451 P.2d 769 (UT 1969).
Appellees submit that under Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225 (Ut. Ct. App.
1991) cert, denied 826 P.2d 651 (UT 1991) and Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
the letter from Thomas Rogan dated August 29, 1997 is inadmissible and cannot be
relied upon to set forth factual disputes in opposition to Appellees' motion for summary
judgment.
B.

The District Court concluded that the Rogan letter ofAugust 1997 was not

a reaffirmation of the debt in the first instance. In Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines

13

Co., 269 P.2d 867,870 (UT1954), the Supreme Court in interpreting U.C.A. §78-12-44
noted with approval:
"In Salt Lake Transfer Company v. Shurtleff, 83 UT 488,489,30 P.2d 733,736,
Mr. Justice Folland, speaking for this Court, noted that later Kansas cases
announced the rule that 'nothing short of a distinct, direct, unqualified, and
intentional admission of a present, subsisting debt on which a party is liable will
be sufficient to take the obligation out of the statute and start it running anew.'
He stated that 'the acknowledgment necessary to start the statute [running] anew
must be more than a hint, a reference, or a discussion of an old debt; it must
amount to a clear recognition of the claim and liability as presently existing. In
re Gillman. Son and Company (DC). 57 F.2d 294.'" (Our emphasis).
The language in the Rogan letter in paragraph 1 is merely a reference or an introductory
paragraph used to identify the promissory note whose liability and amount is disputed
by Appellees. It does not rise to the level of the Beck requirements that it be "distinct,
direct and unqualified admission of a present existing debt". Secondly, it does not meet
the requirements of U.C.A. §78-12-44 which requires that an acknowledgment of debt
must be in writing, signed by the parties sought to be charged thereby. While it is true
that Rogan defended Appellees as an attorney at law with respect to this claim, there is
no affirmative evidence that he was authorized by Appellees to admit any liability for
the obligation or to re-affirm the debt. The District Court never got to that issue because
on its face the Rogan letter does not constitute a clear, distinct reaffirmation of the debt,
but taken as a whole, constitutes an offer in compromise of a disputed matter as to
liability.

14

POINT IV
THE ANDERSON AFFIDAVIT IS INADMISSIBLE FOR LACK OF
FOUNDATION, HERESAY AND RELATING SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS
NOT ALLOWED UNDER RULE 408 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
There should be no dispute that Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that affidavits be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence and show affirmatively that affiant is competent to testify as to
the matters stated therein. See, generally: Treloggan. supra, Gaw, supra, Preston, supra
and Rainford. supra. Heresay testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at
a trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit opposing summary judgment.
Western States Thrift and Loan Company v. Blomquist. 29 UT. 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019,
(1972); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 29 UT. 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538
(1973).
In its Memorandum to Strike (Court file pages 94-97) Appellees objected to
paragraphs 2,4,6,8,11,12,13,14,15,16,17 and 18 of the John Anderson affidavit as
violative of Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and containing inadmissible
settlement discussions. The same paragraphs were objected to as heresay statements.
In paragraph 4 of the Anderson affidavit, Appellees objected to language that
Defendants "were instructed to stop making payments on the note" until September 19,
1997. This statement lacks foundation, constitutes heresay and is violative of Rule 408
of the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding settlement discussions. Paragraph 5 of the

15

4

Anderson affidavit is not based on any personal knowledge of Anderson because
Anderson himself was not signatory or party to the January 5, 1995 Settlement
Agreement, nor were Appellees, and the January 5,1995 Mutual Release and Settlement
Agreement has no application to the present case and is irrelevant. Many of the other
statements of Anderson in paragraph 6 throughout the balance of the agreement were
referred to in Defendants' Reply Memorandum (casefile80-93).
The District Court was not persuaded that the Anderson affidavit had sufficient
foundational basis to be admissible in court. The Court, in its discretion, may exclude
such evidence unless it would be plain error affecting a substantial right. Rule 103 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence and cases thereunder. The District Court granted Appellees
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of John Anderson as lacking foundation even though
Appellees additionally argued that the statements were also inadmissible under Rule 408
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and constituted heresay.

POINT V
THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PRESENTED NO NEW EVIDENCE
AND FACTS
Wells Fargo in its motion for a new trial presented no relevant new facts and no
new case law. The motion for a new trial included additional letters that predated the
due date of the note on June 5,1995. There was no new case law or other affidavits
submitted and, as such, the court denied the motion for a new trial.
16

Appellees in their original motion for summary judgment and in a subsequent
response to the motion for new trial sought an award of attorneys' fees and court costs
for being compelled to respond to an action that appears clearly barred by the six (6)
year statute of limitations and on the motion for new trial there was nothing new
presented or argued of any material bearing. Appellees believe they still should be
awarded their reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs and expenses in responding to this
unjustified action.
CONCLUSION

Wells Fargo's promissory note from 1985 is clearly barred by two state statutes
of limitations limiting said actions to six years after the due date. There is no evidence
of any grounds to extend or toll the statute of limitations. The Rogan letter is not a
reaffirmation of the debt, and is otherwise inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and cannot be the basis for denying a motion under Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Anderson affidavit is likewise inadmissible for
numerous reasons including heresay, lack of foundation and violations of Rule 408.
There are no material factual disputes which would prevent the granting of the motion
for summary judgment or otherwise alter the six year statute of limitations. The
decision of the District Court granting summary judgment and denying the motion for
new trial should be affirmed in all respects and Appellees should be awarded their
reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs and expenses.
17

Respectfully submitted this /

day of July, £003

lichael L. Deamer
Attorneys for Appellees
Temple View Investments,
Greg Stuart, William D'Evelyn
and Richard C. Bennion
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the within and
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ^—day of July
2003, to the following counsel of record:
John A Snow
Bradley M. Strassberg
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Appellant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
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EXHIBIT A

MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Facsimile: (801) 531-0444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WELLS FARGO fka FIRST
INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, as
personal representative of the Estate of
Franklin J. Bradshaw et al,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD C. BENNION

:

Plaintiffs,
v.
TEMPLE VIEW INVESTMENTS,
GREG STUART, WILLIAM
D'EVELYN, and RICHARD C.
BENNION,

:

Civil No. 020904189
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this

day of July, 2002, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, Richard

C. Bennion, Affiant herein, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

Affiant is a defendant in the above-entitled action, signatory to the promissory note

referred to in Plaintiffs Complaint and has personal knowledge of the matters herein set forth.
2.

The promissory note in the amount of $339,232.30 dated November 1, 1985,

payable to Temple View Associates, is an unsecured promissory note and has been unsecured since
its inception.
3.

Affiant knows of his own knowledge and information that the last payment that

could be construed to be a payment on said note was made on July 1, 1994 and there have been
no other payments on said promissory note from July 1, 1994 to the present.
4.

Affiant never executed or delivered a personal guarantee for the obligation reflected

in the promissory note dated November 1, 1985 attached as Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Complaint
in the amount of $339,232.30.
5.

Affiant has never signed a forbearance agreement or any other kind of agreement

nor has Affiant at any time agreed with the holder of the above-referred to note to stop payments
or delay payments or to postpone payments.
6.

The above-referred to promissory note, by its own terms and conditions, was due

and payable on or before June 1, 1995.
7.

Affiant has been compelled to retain legal counsel to assist in defense of the matter

and has incurred legal fees and costs in defending against Plaintiffs claims.

2

8.
information.

The above matters are true and correct of Affiant's own knowledge and
^

Richard C. Bennion, Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this jficijjlay of July, 2002.

'yffftk^
lOcqmld/lOSS

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expir<

0

NOTARY PUBUC
BARBARA R McGRATH
175 East 400 South, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
My Commission Expires
May 22,2004
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Facsimile: (801) 531-0444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WELLS FARGO fka FIRST
INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, as
personal representative of the Estate of
Franklin J. Bradshaw et al,

AFFIDAVIT OF GREG STUART

Plaintiffs,
v.

:

TEMPLE VIEW INVESTMENTS,
GREG STUART, WILLIAM
D'EVELYN, and RICHARD C.
BENNION,

:

Civil No. 020904189
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this [pciiMjay of July, 2002, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, Greg
Stuart, Affiant herein, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

Affiant is a defendant in the above-entitled action, signatory to the promissory note

referred to in Plaintiffs Complaint and has personal knowledge of the matters herein set forth.
2.

The promissory note in the amount of $339,232.30 dated November 1, 1985,

payable to Temple View Associates, is an unsecured promissory note and has been unsecured since
its inception.
3.

Affiant knows of his own knowledge and information that the last payment that

could be construed to be a payment on said note was made on July 1, 1994 and there have been
no other payments on said promissory notefromJuly 1, 1994 to the present.
4.

Affiant never executed or delivered a personal guarantee for the obligation reflected

in the promissory note dated November 1, 1985 attached as Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Complaint
in the amount of $339,232.30.
5.

Affiant has never signed a forbearance agreement or any other kind of agreement

nor has Affiant at any time agreed with the holder of the above-referred to note to stop payments
or delay payments or to postpone payments.
6.

The above-referred to promissory note, by its own terms and conditions, was due

and payable on or before June 1, 1995.
7.

Affiant has been compelled to retain legal counsel to assist in defense of the matter

and has incurred legal fees and costs in defending against Plaintiffs claims.

2

8.

The above matters are true and correct of Affiant's own knowledge and

information.

Greg Stuart, Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (fljlday of July, 2002.

A

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expk^;

10cqmld/1053

NOTARY PUBLIC
BARBARA R McGRATH
175 East 400 South, #700
Satt Lake Crty, UT 84111
My Commission Expires
May 22,2004
STATC OF UTAH
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MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Facsimile: (801) 531-0444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WELLS FARGO fka FIRST
INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, as
personal representative of the Estate of
Franklin J. Bradshaw et al,

AFFD3AVIT OF
WDLLIAM D'EVELYN
:

Plaintiffs,
v.

:

TEMPLE VIEW INVESTMENTS,
GREG STUART, WILLIAM
D'EVELYN, and RICHARD C.
BENNION,

:

Civil No. 020904189

:

Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this lfr*v day of July, 2002, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, William

D'Evelyn, Affiant herein, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

Affiant is a defendant in the above-entitled action, signatory to the promissory note

referred to in Plaintiffs Complaint and has personal knowledge of the matters herein set forth.
2.

The promissory note in the amount of $339,232.30 dated November 1, 1985,

payable to Temple View Associates, is an unsecured promissory note and has been unsecured since
its inception.
3.

Affiant knows of his own knowledge and information that the last payment that

could be construed to be a payment on said note was made on July 1, 1994 and there have been
no other payments on said promissory note from July 1, 1994 to the present.
4.

Affiant never executed or delivered a personal guarantee for the obligation reflected

in the promissory note dated November 1, 1985 attached as Exhibit a A" to Plaintiffs Complaint
in the amount of $339,232.30.
5.

Affiant has never signed a forbearance agreement or any other kind of agreement

nor has Affiant at any time agreed with the holder of the above-referred to note to stop payments
or delay payments or to postpone payments.
6.

The above-referred to promissory note, by its own terms and conditions, was due

and payable on or before June 1, 1995.
7.

Affiant has been compelled to retain legal counsel to assist in defense of the matter

and has incurred legal fees and costs in defending against Plaintiffs claims.

2

8.

The above matters are true and correct of Affiant's own knowledge and

information.

filliam D'Evelyn, Af
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORNtobefore me a k ^ d a y of My,

NOTARY
PUB! ir /
)TARY PUBLIC
Residing at
My Commission Exp!

10cqmld/1054

^1.

V

NOTARY PUBLIC
BARBARA P. McGRATH ,
175 East 400 South, #7001
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
My Commission Expires
May 22, 2004
STATE OF UTAH
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